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Coca Leaves and Colorado: International Law 
and the Shifting Landscape of Drug Reform 
 
CODY T. MASON†  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1961, the international community committed itself to ending 
the production, transportation, and use of narcotic drugs.1 In doing so, 
the adopted Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs stated “addiction 
to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is 
fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,” and called on 
all nations to act on their “duty to prevent and combat this evil.”2 
Accordingly, the treaty required all member states to enforce a 
general prohibition against narcotic drugs, other than for limited 
exceptions,3 including through criminal penalties.4 The treaty ushered 
in a wave of national anti-drug policies across the world and 
continues to serve as the foundation of modern drug prohibition 
policies.5 
 Although over 50 years have passed, and far-reaching 
international cooperation has followed, the success, costs, and effects 
of international drug prohibition remain highly dubious. The United 
Nations estimated that the international rate of illicit drug use during 
 
† J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law. The author would like to thank Martha Hanna for her patience; his family for 
their support; Professor Michael Van Alstine for his guidance; and the Maryland 
Journal of International Law for their tirelessness.   
1. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs art. 2, ¶ 5, opened for signature Jan. 
24, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1964). 
2. Id. at 204. The Single Convention recognizes the medical and scientific 
benefits associated with certain narcotics, and includes limited exceptions for such 
use. Id. 
3. For example, the treaty includes exceptions for medicinal drugs carried on 
ships and aircraft engaged in international traffic. Id. at art. 32. 
4. Id. at art. 36. 
5. Allyn L. Taylor, Addressing the Global Tragedy of Needless Pain: 
Rethinking the United Nations Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 35 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 556, 560 (2007). 
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the 1990s was 3.3 to 4.1 percent.6 Over a decade later, it found that 
3.6 to 6.9 percent of people ages 15 to 64 had used illicit drugs in 
2011.7 Between 1998 and 2012, the amount of opium poppy 
cultivated per year remained relatively stagnant.8 Similarly, the illicit 
cultivation of coca brush decreased by less than ten percent between 
2002 and 2011,9 despite extensive eradication efforts in source 
countries such as Colombia.10 In addition, from the 1980s to 2007, 
the price of many drugs, including powder cocaine, crack cocaine, 
and heroin, fell, while purity remained constant or increased.11 
 Equally disconcerting are the substantial costs incurred by 
implementing this policy, as evidenced by North America’s 
experiences in enforcing prohibition. The United States alone spends 
over $25 billion per year to combat narcotic drugs,12 while some 
economists estimate that the total annual cost, on the federal and state 
levels, is closer to $41 billion.13 Moreover, the costs of prohibition 
are hardly limited to financial expenditures. In 2012, there were over 
1.5 million drug abuse arrests in the United States, with over forty 
percent based on possession of marijuana.14 Between 2006 and 2012, 
 
6. U.N. OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, GLOBAL ILLICIT 
DRUG TRENDS, at 116, U.N. SALES NO. E.99.XI.16 (1999). 
7. U.N OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2013, AT 1, U.N. 
SALES NO. E.13.XI.6 (2013). 
8. Id. at Annex II, at xi. 
9. Id. at Annex II, at xiii. 
10. Michell L. Dion & Catherine Russler, Eradication Efforts, the State, 
Displacement and Poverty: Explaining Coca Cultivation in Colombia during Plan 
Colombia, 40 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 399, 400–01 (2005); see also Guy R. Knudsen, 
War is Peace: How Language Begets Power and Helps to Skirt International Law 
in U.S. Efforts to Eradicate Colombian Coca Crops Using Chemical and Biological 
Agents, 6 CRIT. 55, 60–61 (2013) (discussing the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, 
involving mass coca eradication through the use of aerial herbicides). 
11. ARTHUR FRIES ET AL., INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, THE PRICE AND PURITY 
OF ILLICIT DRUGS: 1981–2007, 9–11 (2008). 
12. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
BUDGET: FY 2013 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS, 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.whiteho 
use.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/fy_2013_budget_highlights.pdf. 
13. JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, CATO INST., THE 
BUDGETARY IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION, 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DrugProhibitionWP.pdf. 
14. Crime in the United States 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/persons-arrested/persons-arrested (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
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over 60,000 Mexicans were killed in drug violence.15 Mexico’s 
military response to that violence, which has been marred with 
accusations of human rights abuses,16 has been subsidized by the 
United States.17 
 Considering the complicated and troubled history of drug 
prohibition, it is not surprising that some countries, states, and cities 
have debated and adopted forms of drug decriminalization, 
regulation, and legalization. But while these policy changes may be 
justified by shifting circumstances and experience, international law 
remains unmoved. Despite a growing wave of drug reform, the Single 
Convention remains the cornerstone of international prohibition-
focused drug policy. 
As such, this paper will explore the status of international drug 
laws, the reforms taking place across the world, and the ability of 
these competing movements to exist together. Part I looks at the 
history and components of the Single Convention.18 Part II discusses 
the enforcement of the Single Convention, with particular attention 
paid to Bolivia’s successful attempt to create a reservation for coca 
leaf chewing.19 Part III outlines some of the most important current 
drug reform efforts, specifically in Uruguay and the American states 
of Colorado and Washington.20 Part IV looks at possible future 
legalization regulations and draws on evidence and recent 
developments to conclude that the modern drug reform movement is 
likely to continue and is incompatible with the Single Convention.21 
The culmination of this paper’s findings is that those interested in 
maintaining the validity of the Single Convention should favor a new 
protocol or reservation or amendment procedure allowing for limited 
legalization efforts for certain substances, such as marijuana. 
 
 
15. MEXICO’S DISAPPEARED: THE ENDURING COST OF A CRISIS IGNORED, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 1 (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ 
files/reports/mexico0213_FoUpload_0_0_0.pdf. 
16. Id. 
17. Merida Initiative, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/inl/merida/ 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. See infra Part II. 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See infra Part IV. 
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I.  THE ROAD TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS 
A. Early International Efforts to Regulate Narcotics  
The first international treaty regulating narcotic drugs was the 
1912 Hague International Opium Convention.22 Although initially 
signed by representatives from only a handful of countries, it gained 
near-universal adherence after it was incorporated into the Treaties of 
Versailles, which ended World War I.23 The Convention, among 
other provisions, required the parties to enact “effective laws or 
regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw 
opium,”24 limit the number of areas for the import and export of raw 
opium,25 prevent the export of raw opium to countries which 
prohibited it,26 and to clearly mark all exported opium as such.27 It 
also called for measures leading to the “gradual and efficacious 
suppression” of the manufacture, internal trade, and use of prepared 
opium.28 The Convention also contained provisions limiting the 
export and import of cocaine and morphine for medicinal purposes.29 
 The 1912 agreement was followed by a second international 
convention signed in Geneva in 1925.30 Like its predecessor, this 
convention dealt with the regulation of narcotic drugs, including 
opium, cocaine, and morphine.31 However, the 1925 agreement also 
introduced regulations of cannabis, which the convention referred to 
as “Indian hemp.”32 The 1925 agreement, which was ratified by 55 
nations, was in turn followed by the 1931 Convention for Limiting 
the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotics Drugs. 
 
22. U.N. Director General/Executive Director of Office on Drugs & Crime, 
Opening Remarks on the Event to Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the 
Signing of the 1912 International Opium Convention, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/ 
en/speeches/2012/1912-international-opium-convention.html (last visited Mar. 24, 
2014). See generally Norman Ansley, International Efforts to Control Narcotics, 
50 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1959) (discussing earlier largely bilateral 
treaties affecting the production and trade of narcotic drugs). 
23. The 1912 Hague International Opium Convention, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS 
& CRIME (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/the-1912-
hague-international-opium-convention.html. 
24. International Opium Convention art. 1, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912 (1912). 
25. Id. at art. 2, at 1930. 
26. Id. at art. 3. 
27. Id. at art. 4, at 1931. 
28. Id. at art. 6. 
29. Id. at art. 10, at 1932. 
30. International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 231. 
31. Id. at art. 4, at 329. 
32. Id. at art. 1. 
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That convention called on its 64 member states and assorted 
territories to create a “special administration” to effectuate the treaty, 
regulate and control the drug trade, and combat drug addiction.33 It 
also divided narcotic substances into groups, or schedules, based on 
their addictive propensity.34 
 In 1936, a new treaty, the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, signaled a shift in the international 
focus toward imprisonment and penal enforcement. The treaty, 
commonly known as the 1936 Trafficking Convention, obligated 
each of the 36 member states to create provisions “severely 
punishing, particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of 
deprivation of liberty,” among other things, the manufacture, 
preparation, possession, distribution, purchase, transport and export 
of narcotic drugs.35 Although the Convention faced limited initial 
acceptance, it paved the way for the modern approach to drug policy 
by creating the first international drug crime offenses.36 
 After World War II, the United Nations took responsibility for 
enforcing the international drug treaties from the League of Nations37 
through the creation of the Lake Success Protocol of 1947.38 The 
scope of international control was then expanded a year later under 
the Paris Protocol to cover thirty previously unregulated synthetic 
drugs.39 In 1953, the number of conventions continued to increase 
with the introduction of the New York Opium Protocol, which 
limited the import and export of opium to that produced in seven 
specific countries.40  
 
33. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution 
of Narcotic Drugs, art. 15, July 13, 1931, 139 L.N.T.S. 303 (1931). 
34. David Bewley-Taylor & Martin Jelsma, Regime Change: Re-visiting the 
1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 23 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 72, 74 (2012). 
35. Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs 
art. 2, June 26, 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 300. 
36. Chronology: 100 Years of Drug Control, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON 
DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/timeline_E 
_PRINT.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
37. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 74. 
38. Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on 
Narcotic Drugs art. II, ¶ 2, Dec. 11, 1946, 12 U.N.T.S. 179. 
39. Ansley, supra note 22, at 109. 
40. Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, 
the Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, June 
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B.  The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Modern Reforms 
 While the intention of the new UN treaties was to broaden and 
update the scope of the previous international drug agreements, they 
were adopted at a time when a parallel effort was underway to 
simplify the array of conventions that had been “developing 
piecemeal since 1912.”41 The result of those efforts was the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which terminated the previous drug 
control conventions42 by merging them into a single uniform 
document.43 As noted by the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), the purposes of the Single Convention were to codify the 
existing drug control treaties and to extend their reach to include “the 
cultivation of plants that were grown as the raw material of narcotic 
drugs.” 44 As such, it was meant to deter drug trafficking and “limit 
the possession, use, trade in, distribution, import, export, manufacture 
and production of drugs exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes.”45 
 The Single Convention set limits on the amount of drugs that 
could be manufactured and imported,46 called for the prohibition of 
narcotic drug cultivation where possible,47 imposed restrictions on 
the manufacture of narcotics,48 and prohibited “the possession of 
drugs except under legal authority,” such as for medical purposes.49 
In addition, the Single Convention created four schedules of drugs, to 
determine which narcotics would be subject to which restrictions.50 In 
order to promote compliance with and implementation of the various 
provisions, the Single Convention created the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs and the INCB.51  
 
23, 1953, 456 U.N.T.S. 35. The seven countries were Bulgaria, Greece, India, Iran, 
Turkey, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Id. art. XV, at 38. 
41. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 74. 
42. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, art. 44, at 258–59. 
43. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 6, at 103. 
44. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL 
BD., http://www.incb.org/incb/en/narcotic-drugs/1961_Convention.html (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
45. Id. 
46. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, art. 21, at 230. 
47. Id. at art. 22, at 232. 
48. Id. at art. 29, at 240. 
49. Id. at art. 33, at 248. 
50. Id. at art. 2, at 208, 210. 
51. Id. at art. 5, at 216. These offices are discussed infra Part II. 
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The Single Convention was amended in 1972, but no dramatic 
changes have been made to its scope or operation.52 Rather, instead 
of adjusting the Single Convention to account for changing cultural 
norms and research, the international community has created similar, 
parallel agreements. For example, in 1976, the Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances entered into force.53 This new treaty, while 
independent of the Single Convention, was modeled after that earlier 
agreement’s format and scheduling system.54 The purpose was to 
expand the list of substances covered by international law to include 
psychotropic drugs, such as LSD, psilocybin, amphetamines, and 
PCP.55 Similar approaches were also taken with the 1988 Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances,56 which expanded regulation to drug precursors,57 and 
the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime,58 which 
addressed issues of drug trafficking, as well as broader areas of 
terrorism and crime.59  
 Although these later conventions expanded the reach of 
international drug laws, the Single Convention remains the 
cornerstone of modern drug policy.60 The institutions and principles it 
put in place continue to influence policymakers throughout the world, 
and 184 states are currently members to the agreement.61 However, as 
 
52. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 78. 
53. Convention on Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Jan. 11, 
1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Aug. 16, 1976). 
54. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 79. 
55. Id. 
56. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95 
(entered into force Nov. 11, 1990). 
57. Legal Framework for Drug Trafficking, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/legal-framework.html (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2013). 
58. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
adopted Nov. 15, 2000, 2255 U.N.T.S. 209 (entered into force Sept. 29, 2003). 
59. G.A. Res. 55/25, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001). 
60. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 6, at 103. 
61. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as Amended by the Protocol 
Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, Aug. 8, 1975, 976 
U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Single Convention as Amended]. A running list of 
signatories is found on the UN website. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 
1961, as Amended by the Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/ 
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explained below, the Single Convention provides for extremely 
limited substantive enforcement options, and member states’ 
compliance has been uneven in many ways. 
II. ENFORCING THE SINGLE CONVENTION 
A.    Enforcement Agencies 
Several international organizations are charged with 
implementing, supervising, and enforcing compliance with the Single 
Convention,62 but two stand out in particular. First, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is charged with 
assisting member states “in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime 
and terrorism.”63 To do this, the UNODC performs research, 
organizes campaigns, attempts to increase the capacity of states to 
counteract illicit drugs, and helps states implement the treaty through 
the development of domestic policies and legislation.64 The 
governing body for the UNODC is the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, which is responsible for “supervising the application of 
international drug control treaties”65 and was created by the Single 
Convention.66 The Commission is also charged with amending the 
drug schedules and making recommendations for implementing the 
Single Convention.67 
 The second international agency, which is more involved than 
UNDOC in actual enforcement, is the quasi-judicial body known as 
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The INCB was 
created by the Single Convention to work with governments “to limit 
the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an 
adequate amount required for medical and scientific purposes.”68 
Despite this role, the INCB does not have any police powers at its 
disposal to enforce the Single Convention.69  
 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&lang=en, 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
62. Taylor, supra note 5, at 560–61. 
63. About UNODC, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/ 
unodc/en/about-unodc/index.html?ref=menutop (last viewed Nov. 10, 2013). 
64. Id. 
65. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/commissions/CND/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013). 
66. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 5, at 216. 
67. Id. at art. 8, at 218. 
68. Single Convention as Amended, supra note 61, at art. 9, ¶ 4, at 112. 
69. Bewley-Taylor & Jelsma, supra note 34, at 75. 
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However, the INCB does have the ability to recommend that the 
member states stop the import or export of drugs, including those for 
purely medical purposes, from or to a violating country.70 Such a 
recommendation is not appealable to a higher body,71 but can only 
occur if the INCB objectively believes that the Single Convention’s 
aims are being “seriously endangered” and if it is satisfied that the 
embargo is “necessary” to prevent that endangerment.72 Moreover, 
the Secretary General’s comments to the Single Convention stress 
that the initiation of a procedure to examine whether a state has failed 
to adhere to the Single Convention is “a serious and very delicate 
matter,” particularly for the reason that it could lead to an embargo.73 
The INCB has never recommended a drug embargo.74 
Instead, the INCB has relied on pressure politics to influence 
countries that are violating, or seem likely to violate, the Single 
Convention. This involves a “name and shame” process that is 
implicitly supported by the possibility of an embargo.75 For example, 
in its 2012 report the INCB noted that the famous “coffee shops” that 
sell marijuana in the Netherlands “are in violation of the provisions 
of the international drug control conventions.”76 This was true despite 
planned reforms, including limiting access to residents of the 
Netherlands aged 18 years or older and limiting the number of annual 
members per shop.77 
As will be discussed below, the INCB’s response to the 
marijuana “coffee shops” is typical of its approach to regulatory 
models that employ even limited drug legalization, even if, as in the 
 
70. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 14, at 224. 
71. INT’L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL BOARD: CURRENT TENSIONS AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 3 (2008), 
available at http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/pdf/IDPC_BP_07.pdf. 
72. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1 at art. 14, at 224. 
73. U.N. SEC’Y-GEN., COMMENTARY ON THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON 
NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, at 178, U.N. Sales No. E.73.XI.1 (1973). 
74. INT’L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, supra note 71, at 3. 
75. Id. 
76. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2012, at 100, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2012/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.13.XI.1 (2012). 
77. Id. 
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Netherlands, that legalization is largely de facto.78 In contrast, the 
INCB has been generally indifferent toward possessory 
decriminalization measures and some medical programs. For 
example, the INCB sent a mission to Portugal in June 2012 and found 
that the government was “fully committed to the objectives” of the 
international drug control conventions,79 even though Portugal 
decriminalized possession of certain amounts of all drugs in 2001.80 
Such levity is in line with the Single Convention’s emphasis on 
allowing narcotics to be used for medical purposes, as well as 
comments to the Single Convention stating that the treaty need not 
necessarily apply to simple possession for personal use.81 However, 
these “exceptions” are very narrow and can often appear 
inconsistent.82 Moreover, they are completely inapplicable when 
member states bypass decriminalization in favor of drug 
legalization.83 
 
 
 
78. See Toleration Policy Regarding Soft Drugs and Coffee Shops, GOV’T OF 
NETHERLANDS, http://www.government.nl/issues/drugs/toleration-policy-regarding 
-soft-drugs-and-coffee-shops (last visited Feb. 26, 2013) (explaining that marijuana 
is technically illegal in the Netherlands, but its use and sale from regulated “coffee 
shops” is officially “tolerated”). 
79. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 76, at 16. 
80. Wiebke Hollersen, ‘This is Working’: Portugal, 12 Years After 
Decriminalizing Drugs, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/inter 
national/europe/evaluating-drug-decriminalization-in-portugal-12-years-later-a-
891060.html. For example, someone may possess one gram of heroin, two grams of 
cocaine, 25 grams of marijuana, 5 grams of hashish, or one gram of MDMA 
without legal repercussions. Id. 
81. U.N. SEC’Y-GEN., supra note 73, at 402. 
82. For example, in its 2012 report, the INCB stated that the “control 
requirements” in place in every American state that has medicinal marijuana “fall 
short” or the requirements within the Convention. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., 
supra note 76, at 66. It also stated that providing “drug injection rooms” for 
addicts, as done in Vancouver, is contrary to the Convention unless “limited 
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes.” Id. at 10. In its 2013 report, the 
INCB stated that the “widely commercialized ‘medical’ cannabis” program in 
Colorado was “poorly implemented and not in conformity with the 1961 
Convention….” INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2013, at 5, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2013/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.14.XI.1 (2014). 
83. See INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 76, at 36 (“The Board 
wishes to point out that such an initiative, if it were to be implemented, would be 
contrary to the provisions of the international drug control conventions.”). 
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B.  Enforcing International Law in Bolivia 
1.   Coca Leaves and the Single Convention 
Indigenous populations in Bolivia and other Andean countries 
have been chewing coca leaves since roughly 3000 B.C.84 This 
practice can be traced back to traditional shamanistic rituals,85 but 
coca leaves are chewed for numerous reasons. For example, it has 
been used to combat the effects of the cold, thin Andean air;86 reduce 
hunger, cold, fatigue, and pain;87 and boost energy.88 However, 
despite this history, the Single Convention states that “[c]oca leaf 
chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years from the coming 
into force of this Convention.”89 Bolivia failed to create a reservation 
to this provision90 when it acceded to the Single Convention in 1976, 
and was thus bound to enforce the prohibition by 2001.91 
This deadline was never fully met, and the INCB has criticized 
the failure of the Bolivian government to successfully enforce the 
prohibition against coca leaf production and use for years.92 For 
example, the INCB’s 1980 report stated that, “[a]lmost all of the 
cocaine abused in the United States is derived from coca leaf 
 
84. Larry W. Cartmell et al., The Frequency and Antiquity of Prehistoric Coca-
Leaf-Chewing Practices in Northern Chile: Radioimmunoassay of a Cocaine 
Metabolite in Human-Mummy Hair, 2 LATIN AM. ANTIQUITY 260, 265 (1991). 
85. Richard T. Martin, The Role of Coca in the History, Religion, and 
Medicine of South American Indians, 24 ECON. BOTANY 422, 424 (1970). 
86. American Society of International Law, Bolivia Rejoins Narcotics 
Convention with Reservation Protecting Coca Leaf over U.S. and Others’ 
Objections, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 460, 461 (John R. Crook ed., 2013). 
87. Robert B. South, Coca in Bolivia, 67 GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 22, 22 
(1977). 
88. Id. at 23. 
89. Single Convention, supra note 1 at art. 49, at 264. 
90. Press Release, Department of Public Information, Press Conference on 
Bolivia’s Proposed Amendment to 1961 Narcotics Drugs Convention, U.N. Press 
Release (June 24, 2011) [hereinafter Press Conference on Bolivia’s Proposed 
Amendment]. 
91. Evo Morales Ayma, Let Me Chew My Coca Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/opinion/14morales.html. 
92. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2011, at v, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2011/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.12.XI.5 (2012). 
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produced illicitly in Peru and Bolivia.”93 In 1996, the INCB noted 
that coca bush eradication in Bolivia had declined,94 and in 2004 it 
voiced concerns over Bolivia’s political commitment to successful 
enforcement.95 In 2009, the INCB urged the Bolivian government to 
adopt more effective policies and to take a more “proactive role” in 
addressing coca leaf cultivation and drug trafficking.96 A year later, 
the INCB noted with “regret” that Bolivia had made no progress in 
implementing suggested reforms.97 Although these repeated warnings 
might appear identical to the regular recriminations given to countries 
such as the Netherlands, Bolivia’s general lack of enforcement in 
regard to coca leaves forebode a more serious confrontation with the 
Single Convention and the INCB. 
2.  An Attempt to Amend 
 In 2005, Bolivians elected the socialist presidential candidate 
Evo Morales into office.98 Morales’ landslide win was historic in that 
he became the country’s first indigenous president.99 Although the 
majority of the population is indigenous,100 the country has 
traditionally been ruled over by Bolivians of Hispanic descent.101 
Morales’s ethnicity, combined with his left-wing ideology and 
friendship with then-president of Venezuela Hugo Chavez portended 
 
93. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 1980, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/51, U.N. Sales 
No. E.81.XI.2 (1980). 
94. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 1996, at 45, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/1996/1 (1996). 
95. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2004, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2004/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.05.XI.3 (2005). 
96. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2009, at 32, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2009/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.10.XI.1 (2010). 
97. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD FOR 2010, at 23, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/2010/1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.11.XI.1 (2011). 
98. Juan Forero, Coco Advocate Wins Election for President in Bolivia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/19/international/americas/ 
19bolivia.html?_r=0. 
99. Rory Carroll, Evo Morales Wins Landslide Victory in Bolivian Presidential 
Elections, GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/ 
07/morales-presidential-victory. 
100. Id. 
101. Bolivia Profile, BBC, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-18727507. 
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significant changes both domestically and abroad,102 but another 
aspect of Morales’ resume posed a different issue for the international 
community. Namely, Morales is a former coca leaf farmer and has 
chaired Bolivia’s coca leaf growers union since 1996.103 He was re-
elected to that post as recently as the summer of 2012.104 
 Morales’ background, combined with Bolivia’s failure to 
effectively implement the prohibition of coca leaf chewing by 2001, 
set the stage for the Bolivian government’s attempts to reshape its 
role in relation to the Single Convention. In 2006, President Morales 
called on the UN General Assembly to remove coca leaves from 
international control.105 In 2007, the Bolivian government requested 
that the World Health Organization begin a process of evaluating and 
validating the medicinal properties of coca leaves.106 The following 
year, President Morales reiterated his view that coca leaves should 
not be under international control in a letter to the UN Secretary-
General.107 
More dramatically, in 2009, Bolivia approved a new constitution 
requiring the state to “protect native and ancestral coca” and 
emphatically stating that the coca leaf “is not a narcotic.”108 The new 
constitution also provided that the “revaluation, production, sale and 
industrialization of coca shall be governed by law.”109 Morales was a 
strong supporter of the new constitution, which also increased 
indigenous rights and loosened presidential term limits, and 
reportedly wept for joy when a draft version was agreed to in 2008.110 
 
102. A Champion of Indigineous Rights—and of State Control of the Economy, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.economist.com/node/5300873. 
103. Ryan Villarreal, Why Bolivian President Morales Still Heads Coca 
Growers Union, INT’L BUS. TIMES, July 10, 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/why-
bolivian-president-morales-still-heads-coca-growers-union-722548. 
104. Bolivia’s Evo Morales Re-elected Coca Growers’ Leader, BBC NEWS, 
July 9, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18768929. 
105. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 93, at 36. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 36–37. 
108. NUEVA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO Oct. 2008, art. 384 (Bol.). 
109. Id. 
110. Matthew Taylor, Evo Morales Hails ‘New Bolivia’ as Constitution Is 
Approved, GUARDIAN, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/ 
26/bolivia. 
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The new constitution and its coca leaf provision were followed 
by a direct assault on the Single Convention. Specifically, Morales 
introduced a treaty amendment that would remove coca leaves from 
the list of prohibited narcotic drugs by deleting Article 49, 
Paragraphs 1(c)111 and 2(e)112 from the Single Convention.113 In a 
New York Times op-ed, Morales argued that the initial classification 
was a mistake that ignored the history, benefits, and lack of negative 
side effects of coca leaf chewing.114 
 Under Article 47 of the Single Convention, any party may 
propose an amendment to the treaty, which must then be circulated to 
the relevant international bodies and the other member states.115 An 
amendment will enter into effect if no objections are raised in the 18 
months after its circulation.116 If a single party rejects the 
amendment, the Economic and Social Council has the option of 
calling a convention to consider the proposed change.117 In the case 
of Bolivia’s proposed amendment, the deadline for member states to 
lodge an objection was January 31, 2011.118 Three countries – the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden – rejected the 
proposed amendment before the deadline passed.119 Those objections 
sunk President Morales’ attempt to amend the Single Convention and 
ultimately shifted Bolivia’s efforts toward a far less orthodox 
approach. 
3. Denunciations, Reservations, and Re-Adherences 
On June 24, 2011, the Bolivian Ambassador to the United 
Nations Pablo Solón announced that Bolivia would “denounce” the 
 
111. “A Party may at the time of signature, ratification or accession reserve the 
right to permit temporarily in any one of its territories: … (c) Coca leaf chewing.” 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 49. 
112. “The reservations under paragraph 1 shall be subject to the following 
restrictions: … (e) Coca leaf chewing must be abolished within twenty-five years 
from the coming into force of this Convention as provided in paragraph 1 of article 
41.” Id. 
President of Bolivia, Letter dated Mar. 12, 2009 from the President of Bolivia 
to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2009/78 (May 15, 2009) (Enclosure). 
114. Morales Ayma, supra note 91. 
115. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 1, at art. 47. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. U.N. Dep’t Pub. Info, Press Conference by Bolivia on Amendment to 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.un.org/News/ 
briefings/docs/2011/110128_Bolivia.doc.htm. 
119. Id. 
252 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 29:238 
 
 
Single Convention.120 Having been unable to amend the Single 
Convention, Bolivia turned to leaving the agreement in order to re-
adhere with a reservation protecting the historical right to chew coca 
leaves.121 Solón stated that Bolivia’s withdrawal and re-adherence to 
the Single Convention would both occur on January 1, 2012, and that 
the country’s legislature was already in the process of approving the 
necessary legislation.122 Moreover, he assured the international 
community that Bolivia would remain in compliance with the rest of 
the treaty pending re-adherence.123 If less than one-third of the 
member states—61—objected to the re-adherence in the 12 months 
following its withdrawal, Bolivia would rejoin the Single 
Convention.124 
After formally withdrawing from the Single Convention, 
President Morales continued to push the United Nations to amend the 
treaty to exempt the chewing of raw coca leaves.125 This was 
unsuccessful, and Bolivia ultimately faced resistance to its re-
adherence plan. For example, in its 2011 report, the INCB noted that 
while Bolivia’s “unprecedented” denunciation “may be technically 
permitted under the Convention, it is contrary to the fundamental 
object and spirit of the Convention.”126 Moreover, the INCB warned 
that allowing such a move to succeed would undermine the integrity 
of the drug control system and would compromise “the achievements 
of the past 100 years in drug control.”127 The INCB, however, did not 
threaten a drug embargo.128 Bolivia’s proposed re-adherence was also 
formally opposed by several influential countries, including the 
 
120. Press Conference on Bolivia’s Proposed Amendment, supra note 90. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. U.N. Office of Drugs & Crime, Bolivia to Re-accede to UN Drug 
Convention, while Making Exception on Coca Leaf Chewing (last visited Apr. 1, 
2014), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2013/January/bolivia-to-re-
accede-to-un-drug-convention-while-making-exception-on-coca-leaf-chewing.html 
[hereinafter Bolivia to Re-accede]. 
125. Marilla Brocchetto, Bolivia’s Morales to UN: Legalize Coca-Leaf 
Chewing, CNN (Mar. 13, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/13/world 
/americas/bolivia-morales-coca/. 
126. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 92, at v. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
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United States and the other members of the G8. 129 However, only 15 
countries130 ended up formally objecting—far short of 61 required to 
block re-adherence—allowing Bolivia to become a member to the 
Single Convention, with its new reservation,131 effective February 10, 
2013.132  
III. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION 
 Bolivia’s challenge to the Single Convention was a clear loss for 
the INCB and traditional drug control mechanisms. Although Bolivia 
failed to amend the Single Convention, it successfully withdrew and 
re-adhered with a reservation, despite the INCB’s dire warnings133 
and the unequivocal language of the Single Convention. It is too soon 
to know the full effects of Bolivia’s re-adherence strategy, but it has 
set the stage for further conflicts between individual states and the 
INCB. In fact, significant challenges arose soon after Bolivia’s re-
adherence, in the form of marijuana legalization initiatives recently 
enacted in Uruguay and the American states of Colorado and 
Washington. 
A. Legalization Programs 
The programs pursued by Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington 
differ in their scope and execution but will result in the same 
outcome: the legalization and regulation of recreational marijuana 
possession and sales. 
1. Marijuana Legalization in Uruguay 
 
129. Press Release, Washington Office on Latin Am., Bolivia Wins a Rightful 
Victory on the Coca Leaf (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.wola.org/news/ 
bolivia_wins_a_rightful_victory_on_the_coca_leaf. 
130. Id. The 15 countries objecting to re-adherence were: Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
131. The reservation states:  
The Plurinational State of Bolivia reserves the right to allow in its 
territory: traditional coca leaf chewing; the consumption and use of the 
coca leaf in its natural state for cultural and medicinal purposes, such as its 
use in infusions; and also the cultivation, trade and possession of the coca 
leaf to the extent necessary for these licit purposes. At the same time, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia will continue to take all necessary measures 
to control the cultivation of coca in order to prevent its abuse and the illicit 
production of the narcotic drugs which may be extracted from the leaf. 
Single Convention as Amended, supra note 61. 
132. Bolivia to Re-accede, supra note 124. 
133. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 92, at v. 
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Uruguay is a small South American state that became the first 
country since the adoption of the modern drug control model to 
legalize recreational marijuana.134 Despite the country officially 
acceding to the Single Convention in 1975135 and signs of opposition 
among the public,136 Uruguay’s lower house passed a bill in the 
summer of 2013 to legalize and regulate the production, distribution, 
and sale of marijuana.137 The closely divided vote sent the bill to the 
senate, which passed the measure on December 10, 2013.138 The 
President of Uruguay José Mujica signed it into law 13 days later.139 
 Marijuana use has been decriminalized in Uruguay since the 
1970s,140 but the recent measure furthered this move away from the 
penal approach by allowing marijuana to be sold in pharmacies.141 
Purchases of marijuana will be limited to locals142 that are 18 years or 
 
134. Hannah Hetzer, Finally, a Nation Legalizes Pot, CNN (Dec. 11, 2013, 
6:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/10/opinion/hetzer-uruguay-legalizes-
marijuana/. 
135. Single Convention as Amended, supra note 61. 
136. At least one poll put support for legalization at 26 percent, with 64 
percent opposed. El Proyecto de Ley Para Regular El Cultivo y Consumo de 
Marihuana, GONZÁLEZ RAGA & ASOCIADOS (Dec. 2012), http://www.cifra.com.uy 
/novedades.php?idNoticia=182; Geoffrey Ramsey, Uruguay’s Marijuana Bill 
Faces Political, Economic Obstacles, In Sight Crime (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.insightcrime.org/uruguay-legalization-drugs/uruguay-marijuana-bill-
faces-political-economic-obstacles. 
137. Eloisa Capurro et al., Uruguay’s Lower House Votes to Legalize 
Marijuana, CNN, Aug. 1, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/world/americas/ 
uruguay-marijuana-legalization/index.html. 
138. Nick Miroff, Uruguay Votes to Legalize Marijuana, WASH. POST, Dec. 
11, 2013, at A11. 
139. Steven Nelson, Uruguay’s President Quietly Signs Marijuana 
Legalization Bill, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 26, 2013, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/26/uruguays-president-quietly-
signs-marijuana-legalization-bill. 
140. Juan Forero, Growers Celebrate as Uruguay Prepares to Legalize 
Marijuana Cultivation, Distribution, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/pot-growers-celebrate-as-uruguay-
legalizes-cultivation-and-consumption-of-marijuana/2013/10/23/f8044fc6-3bfe-
11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story.html. 
141. Id. 
142. Tony Grands, Blaze Up: Uruguay Becomes the World’s First Country to 
Legalize Marijuana, URBAN DAILY (Dec. 11, 2013), http://theurbandaily.com/2013 
/12/11/uruguay-legalized-marijuana/. 
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older, and to 40 grams per month.143 Citizens can also grow up to six 
marijuana plants at home and form smoking clubs allowed to produce 
up to 99 plants per year.144 The government will control the 
psychoactive level of the marijuana sold by testing and limiting the 
tetrahydrocannabinal (THC) levels of all plants.145 In addition, the 
government will advise consumers on the best ways to consume 
marijuana and will create a confidential registry of those who 
purchase the drug.146 Cultivation and production, while regulated, 
will be left to private enterprises.147  
President Mujica’s stated purpose in signing the bill was to 
eliminate the illegal trade in marijuana by creating a regulated market 
that will sell marijuana at a fixed, lower price.148 Uruguay’s drug czar 
stated, prior to passage, that marijuana sales would begin in the 
second half of 2014 at a price of one dollar per gram.149 Official 
guidance issued since passage has suggested a lower price of between 
87 cents and one dollar per gram.150 The government says that 
marijuana is the most commonly used illegal substance in Uruguay 
and that drug traffickers earn $30 to $40 million per year from the 
marijuana market.151 
2.    Marijuana Legalization in Colorado and Washington 
The United States is not a stranger to marijuana reform, despite 
its role as a primary supporter of the modern approach to drug 
 
143. Rafael Romo, New Rules in Uruguay Create a Legal Marijuana Market, 
CNN, May 6, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/06/world/americas/uruguay-
marijuana-rules/. 
144. Miroff, supra note 138. 
145. Uki Goni, Uruguay Sets Price of Legalised Cannabis at $1 a Gram, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/ 
22/uruguay-legal-cannabis-1-dollar-gram. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Capurro et al., supra note 137. There is some evidence that the illegal 
trade may already be suffering thanks to American legalization programs. Nick 
Miroff, Tracing the U.S. Heroin Surge Back South of the Border as Mexican 
Cannabis Output Falls, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/tracing-the-us-heroin-surge-back-south-of-the-border-as-mexican-
cannabis-output-falls/2014/04/06/58dfc590-2123-4cc6-b664-
1e5948960576_story.html. 
149. Goni, supra note 145. 
150. Malena Castaldi, Uruguay Says Legal Marijuana to Be Good and Cheap, 
REUTERS, May 7, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/07/us-uruguay-
marijuana-idUSBREA460JR20140507. 
151. Capurro et al., supra note 137. 
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prohibition. As of June 2014, 22 states and the District of Columbia 
have enacted varying medical marijuana programs.152 19 states have 
decriminalized the possession of certain amounts of marijuana under 
particular circumstances,153 and the District of Columbia, barring 
federal action, will soon follow suit.154 According to the National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, these 
decriminalization policies typically treat the first-time possession of 
small amounts of marijuana for personal use like “a minor traffic 
ticket,” in that punishment does not involve prison time or a criminal 
record.155 Although these approaches have become relatively 
widespread in recent years, the states of Colorado and Washington 
 
152. State Policy, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/states/ 
(last visited June 23, 2014). The states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. New York will become 
the 23rd state with a medical marijuana program if, as expected, Governor Andrew 
Cuomo signs a medical marijuana bill passed by the state legislature in June 2014. 
Jesse McKinley, New York Senate Passes Bill on Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/21/nyregion/new-york-senate-
passes-bill-on-medical-marijuana.html?_r=0. In addition, some states, such as 
Florida and North Carolina, have approved or will likely approve medical programs 
allowing for the use of marijuana oil. See Lisa Crivelli, Medical marijuana oil bills 
approved in North Carolina, Florida, MSNBC, (June 19, 2014), 
http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/medical-marijuana-oil-bills-approved-north-
carolina-florida. 
153. Id. The states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington. 
154. Eyder Peralta, D.C. Mayor Signs Bill Decriminalizing Some Marijuana 
Use, NPR, Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/31/29733 
9798/d-c-mayor-signs-bill-decriminalizing-some-marijuana-use. Mayor Vincent 
Gray signed the decriminalization bill on March 31, 2014, but Congress has a 60-
day window in which it can block the law from coming into force. Id. At the time 
of publication, it appeared likely that Congress would not block decriminalization 
from going into effect. See Hannah Hess, Advocates Fired Up as D.C. Marijuana 
Decriminalization Avoids Appropriations Rider, ROLL CALL, June 18, 2014, 
http://blogs.rollcall.com/hill-blotter/advocates-fired-up-as-d-c-marijuana-
decriminalization-avoids-appropriations-rider/?dcz=. 
155. States That Have Decriminalized, NAT. ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF 
MARIJUANA LAWS, http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-
decriminalized (last visited June 23, 2014). 
2014]    COCA LEAVES AND COLORADO  257 
made history in 2012 when voters in both states approved ballot 
measures legalizing recreational marijuana.156  
Colorado’s Amendment 64 changed the state constitution to 
allow the use of marijuana for persons twenty-one years of age or 
older and called for the marijuana market to be taxed and regulated 
“in a manner similar to alcohol.”157 The amendment allows for the 
possession, cultivation, and transportation of up to six marijuana 
plants, the transfer of up to one ounce of marijuana without payment, 
and the purchase of marijuana from licensed retail stores.158 It also 
requires specific regulations on all aspects of the marijuana trade.159 
Accordingly, in September 2013, Colorado became the first 
American state to adopt rules for legal, recreational marijuana.160 The 
Colorado Department of Revenue’s 134-page report on the accepted 
provisions lays out every aspect of the state’s regulation of the 
marijuana industry, from the testing of retail facilities to waste 
disposal and advertising.161 Voters in Colorado further legitimized 
the program when they approved a retail marijuana sales tax with 
over 65 percent of the vote in 2013.162 The 15 percent tax is expected 
to bring in $67 million per year, which will go toward the regulation 
of retail marijuana stores, addressing the collateral impact of 
marijuana legalization, and school construction.163 With the 
 
156. Amendment 64 in Colorado was passed with roughly 55 percent of the 
vote, while voters in Washington enacted Initiative 502 with approval by about 56 
percent of that state’s vote. Marijuana Legalization on the Ballot (LIVE RESULTS), 
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/marijuana-
legalization-results_n_2074168.html (last updated Nov. 7, 2012). 
157. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Matt Ferner, Colorado First State in U.S. to Adopt Rules for Legal, 
Recreational Marijuana, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2013, 7:08 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/10/colorado-first-state-rules-
marijuana_n_3902602.html. 
161. COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT DIV., PERMANENT 
RULES RELATED TO THE COLORADO RETAIL MARIJUANA CODE (Sept. 9, 2013), 
available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=ap 
plication%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=12518838470
85. 
162. John Ingold, Colorado Voters Overwhelmingly Approve State Marijuana 
Tax, DENVER POST, Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_ 
24461038/colorado-voters-decide-how-heavily-tax-marijuana-sales. 
163. Id. Colorado is reported to have brought in nearly $25 million in revenue 
from the first three months of legalization. JC Sevcik, Colorado Generates over 
$25M in Marijuana Revenue Since Legalization, UPI (May 9, 2014, 4:32 PM), 
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regulations and taxes in place, the first recreational retail marijuana 
shops opened on January 1, 2014.164 
Similar to the Colorado amendment, the Washington initiative 
legalizing marijuana requires taxation and regulation in a manner 
“similar to that for controlling hard alcohol.”165 Furthermore, it 
allows for the “production, possession, delivery, distribution, and sale 
of marijuana” from specially licensed retailers and processors.166 
Like its counterpart in Colorado, the initiative limits its provisions to 
persons twenty-one years of age or older, and lays out specific 
requirements for licensing, sales, and regulations.167 Individuals may 
possess up to one ounce of useable marijuana without facing criminal 
prosecution, and the state estimates that marijuana will cost roughly 
12 dollars per gram.168 The new law imposes a 25 percent tax on all 
sales.169 
The initiative left licensing, core regulations, and the drafting of 
rules to the Washington State Liquor Control Board, which approved 
a set of proposed rules in September 2013.170 Among the rules were 
limits on the amount of space available for cultivation, caps on the 
total number of cultivated marijuana, as well as requirements for 
labeling and child-resistant packaging.171 The rules took effect on 
November 16, 2013,172 and the Liquor Control Board currently lists 
 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2014/05/09/Colorado-generates-over-25M-in-
marijuana-revenue-since-legalization/1981399662232/. 
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165. 2013 Wash. Sess. Laws 28. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., INITIATIVE 502’S IMPACT ON THE 
WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BOARD (NOV. 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.liq.wa.gov/publications/Marijuana/I-502/Fact-Sheet-I-502-REVISED-
11-19-12.pdf. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. See Board Approves Filing of Proposed Rules to Implement Initiative 
502, WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD. (Sept. 4, 2013), available at 
http://liq.wa.gov/pressreleases/board_approves_filing_of_proposed_rules_to_imple
ment_initiative_502_sept_4%20. 
171. WASH. STATE LIQUOR CONTROL BD., supra note 168. 
172. Id. 
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334 retail marijuana outlets registered with the state.173 Commercial 
sales, however, will likely not begin until July 2014.174 
B.    The Single Convention versus Marijuana Legalization 
Predictably, the developments in Uruguay and the United States 
have not received a warm reception from proponents of the Single 
Convention. In the case of Uruguay, the INCB warned prior to 
passage that the legalization bill “would be in complete contravention 
to the provisions of the international drug control treaties” and would 
have “serious consequences for the health and welfare of the 
population and for the prevention of cannabis abuse among the 
young.”175 After passage, the INCB chastised Uruguay for 
“knowingly decid[ing] to break the universally agreed and 
internationally endorsed legal provisions of the treaty.”176 
The U.S. State Department also cautioned Uruguay against 
ignoring its international commitments,177 which serves to illustrate 
the conflicted position of the United States in relation to the Single 
Convention, considering the INCB has made similar comments in 
regard to the legalization programs in Washington and Colorado. 
Although less dramatic than its warnings to Uruguay, the INCB 
voiced “grave concern” over the referenda and stressed that member 
states have an obligation to “ensure their full compliance with the 
conventions within their entire territory, including federated states 
and/or provinces.”178  The INCB reiterated this point several months 
later.179 
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Despite this warning, some commentators have argued that the 
Single Convention has no bearing on the actions of individual 
American states, because they are not themselves parties to the 
treaty.180 However, the INCB obviously does not agree with that 
interpretation and has previously requested that the United States 
“take effective measures to ensure the implementation of all control 
measures for cannabis plants and cannabis” in response to existing 
and possible medical marijuana and decriminalization laws.181 
Moreover, the fact that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
announced in August 2013 that it would allow the Colorado and 
Washington laws to go into effect without challenging them would 
seem to seriously complicate any claim that the Single Convention 
has not been implicated,182 and raises significant questions about the 
federal government’s commitment to the treaty. Specifically, the DOJ 
has stated that it will not sue Colorado or Washington, or attempt to 
enforce marijuana prohibition in their territories, so long as eight 
requirements are met, including preventing use by minors, keeping 
marijuana out of interstate commerce, and stopping the sale of 
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obligation to ensure the implementation of the treaties on the entirety of its 
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HUFFINGTON POST, (Sept. 25, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
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States government, not the governments of the individual states, is a signatory to 
the drug control treaty). 
181. INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL BD., supra note 76, at 66. (“The Board notes 
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marijuana from benefitting criminals.183 In addition, the DOJ and the 
Treasury Department have released guidelines for banks to legally 
provide financial services to legal marijuana retailers184 and the U.S. 
House of Representatives has voted to stop the federal government 
from interfering with state medical marijuana programs.185 The INCB 
responded to the new DOJ memorandum in its 2013 report by simply 
noting that “[t]he Board wishes to reiterate that the 1961 Convention 
limits the use of cannabis to medical and scientific purposes within 
the strict conditions set forth in the Convention”186 and by “urg[ing] 
the Government of the United States to continue to ensure the full 
implementation of the international drug control treaties on its entire 
territory.”187 
IV. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO THE SINGLE CONVENTION 
 In recent years, the INCB has faced significant hurdles in 
enforcing the Single Convention. From Bolivia’s coca leaf 
reservation to Uruguay’s legalization of marijuana, the Single 
Convention has teetered between respected international law and a 
symbolic arrangement lacking a real sense of legitimacy. While the 
INCB has arguably done its best to harmonize its statutory 
obligations with the reality of 184 countries individually addressing 
drug control issues, this balancing act is set to be further challenged 
in coming years. 
A.    Criticism and Legalization Efforts 
 Latin America, which has borne the brunt of drug-related 
violence, is home to several former and current leaders, in addition to 
the presidents of Bolivia and Uruguay, willing to question the Single 
Convention’s drug control paradigm. Vicente Fox, former president 
of Mexico from 2000 to 2006, has pressed for the legalization of the 
production, transit, and sale of all drugs.188 Since 2011, the current 
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president of Guatemala, Otto Perez Molina, has been calling for 
changes to the Single Convention and has lauded legalization 
programs, such as those in Washington and Colorado.189 Mexico 
decriminalized the possession of small amounts of drugs in 2009,190 
and lawmakers in Mexico City are considering using that country’s 
system of federalism to decriminalize and regulate marijuana within 
the city limits.191 More recently, Mexican President Enrique Peña 
Nieto suggested that the national legalization of marijuana should be 
considered.192 Lawmakers in Puerto Rico, Chile, Belize, Barbados, 
and Trinidad and Tobago are reportedly drafting marijuana 
legalization plans.193 Elsewhere, the Moroccan Parliament has 
considered legalizing marijuana cultivation,194 and the leader of one 
of Canada’s main opposition parties now favors full legalization.195 
The Jamaican government announced plans to decriminalize 
possession of small amounts of marijuana in June 2014.196 
Another former president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, co-
authored a report in 2009 with the former president of Brazil 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and the former president of Colombia 
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César Gaviria in which they identified the war on drugs and 
prohibitionist policies as failures.197 They also joined another report 
in 2011 that called for the legalization of some drugs.198 The former 
presidents were joined on that report by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, former U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz, 
former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, former Federal Reserve 
chief Paul Volcker, and former Swiss President Ruth Dreifuss, 
among others.199 The call for legalization was reiterated in a similar 
2013 report arguing that the war on drugs has failed to reduce the 
supply or use of drugs, and has instead contributed to HIV and 
hepatitis pandemics.200 Likewise a 2014 report issued by the West 
African Commission on Drugs, which is chaired by a former 
Nigerian president and is comprised of several other former West 
African leaders, called for the “decriminalization of drug use and 
low-level non-violent drug offences.”201 
At the same time that the Single Convention has come under 
increasing elite criticism, it seems poised to be further undermined by 
one of its most fervent champions: the United States. Specifically, 
several states are likely to follow Colorado and Washington in 
enacting state-level marijuana legalization programs. Alaska will 
hold a referendum on marijuana legalization in August of 2014,202 
and recent polling has found over 50 percent support for the 
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measure.203 Efforts are also under way to gather signatures for 
legalization ballot initiatives in Oregon204 and the District of 
Columbia.205 Advocates in California will attempt to put a 
legalization question on the ballot in America’s most populous state 
in 2016.206 Although voters rejected a similar initiative in 2010, a 
recent poll put support for legalization at 60 percent.207 
Commentators have pointed to Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Montana, Nevada, and Vermont as other states likely to legalize 
marijuana soon,208 while public polling has found majority support 
for legalization in others states, including Maryland209 and New 
York.210 
Moreover, on a national level, Americans have increasingly 
turned away from marijuana prohibition. In 2011, Gallup found that 
 
203. Alaska Miscellany, PUB. POL’Y POLLING (Feb. 5, 2014), 
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2014/02/alaska-miscellany.html#more. 
204. Jeff Mapes, With National Backing, Marijuana Advocates File 
Legalization Measure, OREGONIAN, Oct. 25, 2013, http://www.oregonlive.com/ma 
pes/index.ssf/2013/10/with_national_backing_marijuan.html. 
205. Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Elections Board Allows Marijuana Legalization 
Effort to Move Forward, WASH. POST, March 11, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/dc-politics/dc-elections-board-allows-marijuana-legalization-effort-to-move-
forward/2014/03/11/7821db7c-a402-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html.  
206. Maria L. La Ganga, California Ballot Measure on Pot Legalization 
Delayed Until 2016, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la 
-na-pot-measure-20140218,0,3213398.story#axzz2tdEtCRUG. 
207. Lydia O’Connor, Most Californians Support Marijuana Legalization, 
Says Poll, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:05 P.M.), http://www.huffingtonpo 
st.com/2013/09/27/california-marijuana-legalization_n_4005646.html. 
208. See, e.g., id. (listing states where marijuana legislation is being or has 
been considered); Fabien Tepper, Colorado Marijuana Sales: Long Lines for 
Smooth Rollout of Legal Business, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2014/0102/Colorado-marijuana-
sales-Long-lines-for-smooth-rollout-of-legal-business (indicating several states that 
could consider marijuana ballot measures by 2016). 
209. Maryland Survey Results, PUB. POL’Y POLLING (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/download-materials/Maryland-Poll-Results.pdf 
(showing support at sixty-eight percent). 
210. Press Release, Quinnipac Univ. Polling Inst., New York Voters Back 
Medical Marijuana 10-1, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds; Strong Support for 
Recreational Marijuana Also (Feb. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/ny/ny02172014_b1s5tv.pdf/ (indicating 
that fifty-seven percent of New York residents support the legalization of small 
amounts of marijuana). 
2014]    COCA LEAVES AND COLORADO  265 
50 percent of Americans favored legalization.211 By 2013, support 
had climbed to 58 percent,212 while a Pew survey found 52 percent in 
favor of legalization.213 A CNN poll in early 2014 found support for 
legal marijuana sales standing at 54 percent, and support for 
legalizing the use of marijuana at 55 percent.214 In addition, a 2012 
Gallup poll found that 64 percent of American adults thought that the 
federal government should not take steps to enforce federal marijuana 
laws in states where it has been legalized.215 In light of these 
developments, it is now evident that the question is not whether other 
states will legalize marijuana, but rather what state will do it next. 
B.    A Choice Between Possible Failure and Probable Failure 
The current drug control policy dynamics make clear that the 
Single Convention and the INCB are fighting a losing war. The 
international trend is unquestionably toward more lenient approaches 
to at least some drugs, particularly marijuana. As such, supporters of 
the Single Convention are stuck between two unpleasant options. 
First, they could continue to stand by the current Convention in an 
attempt to stop further legalization efforts, but that would risk failure 
and possible irrelevancy for the treaty. On the other hand, supporters 
could cede partial defeat, most likely in the form of accepting some 
marijuana legalization, which could theoretically open the door to 
further attacks against the Single Convention’s provisions. For 
supporters of the Single Convention, this may feel like being stuck 
between a rock and a hard place. But when viewed objectively it is 
far more equivalent to choosing between defeat and a tactical retreat. 
Neither approach is a sure success, but the current model under 
the Single Convention is simply untenable. The INCB has relied 
exclusively on “naming and shaming” offending countries, to little 
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avail.216 Its only other option would be to recommend a drug 
embargo,217 but its success, and even acceptance, would be highly 
uncertain, particularly in cases with the United States or when the 
violation involves less stigmatized substances, such as marijuana. As 
such, the INCB’s current approach results in options that would do 
little more than make the INCB and the Single Convention appear 
ineffective and meaningless. 
Stuck in this losing situation, supporters of the Single 
Convention, if they want to maintain some semblance of the current 
drug regime, should cede the battle in an attempt to salvage the war. 
Its supporters should be open to amendments for the legal regulation 
of certain substances and to permit greater flexibility on the domestic 
level. Specifically, they should use the experience with Bolivia as a 
rough template whereby a new protocol, reservations, or amendments 
can be used as a safety valve for national reform movements.  
Bolivia legalized the use of coca leaves prior to any adjustments 
in its relation to the Single Convention. Its actions were in obvious 
contravention of the treaty, but the government was clearly not 
deterred by that reality. Indeed, the only real question in relation to 
the coca leaf legalization effort was whether Bolivia would be 
allowed to re-adhere and comply with the rest of the treaty or be 
removed completely from the agreement. A strict approach to the 
Single Convention would have undoubtedly led to the latter of these 
scenarios, if not an attempted embargo, while the former, which did 
occur, struck a balance between respecting Bolivians’ historical use 
of the coca leaf with the international obligation of preventing the 
production, transportation, and possession of processed cocaine. In 
this way, the new reservation served as a safety valve allowing for 
the use of coca leaves, while cutting off momentum for any further 
contempt or efforts against the Single Convention. 
A comparable, ideally standardized, approach to marijuana for 
countries such as Uruguay would serve a similarly appropriate 
purpose. Namely, countries desiring to reform their drug laws would 
be effectively permitted to do so, while being required to enforce the 
rest of the Single Convention. This would sanction, without 
endorsing, reforms that would take place regardless of the treaty, as 
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witnessed in Bolivia, Uruguay, Colorado, and Washington, while 
respecting the remainder and overarching purpose of the Single 
Convention. Although hardly ideal for supporters of the treaty, the 
alternative would likely result in countries leaving the Single 
Convention as a whole, or, as now appears to be the case, remaining 
party to the agreement while flagrantly disregarding portions of their 
obligations. 
This paper’s suggested reforms would be best accomplished 
through the adoption of a protocol allowing for some of the Single 
Convention’s strictly prohibition-based requirements to be replaced 
with specific goal-based obligations. Those goals could include 
reducing drug-related violence, levels of addiction, and criminal 
trafficking, and individual countries would be free to choose their 
own means for reaching them. Such a protocol would create the 
opportunity for countries to attempt to address these serious problems 
through avenues other than prohibition and criminal sanctions, 
including decriminalization or legalization. The protocol could be 
limited to specific substances, such as marijuana, without removing 
all of the Single Convention’s prohibition-based requirements. 
Moreover, it would have the benefit of allowing for experimentation 
in some countries, while allowing others to maintain the strictly 
prohibitory policies found in the Single Convention.218 This 
flexibility would be preferable over a full amendment changing the 
requirements for all parties, as well as the re-adherence strategy 
followed by Bolivia, which is open to more abuse and inconsistency.  
 However, regardless of the method, allowing for more 
flexibility on the national level would not compel total abandonment 
of the Single Convention. Rather, it would require the courage to say 
that times have changed, and that our international drug policies need 
to adapt accordingly. Such a shift would not only bolster the INCB’s 
credibility and protect the Single Convention from sustained attacks 
of rigidity and irrelevance, but also could lead to more effective and 
humane solutions to the problems associated with drug trafficking 
and abuse. 
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         CONCLUSION 
 This paper does not call for a total revamp of the Single 
Convention. It does not even call for the removal from international 
control of any substances, although such a change may be necessary 
in coming years. Instead, what it does suggest is that supporters of the 
Single Convention recognize the current trends in the drug reform 
movement. In doing so, they should use the example of Bolivia and 
coca leaves as a basic, if procedurally imperfect, template for how to 
address changing cultural norms and policies. A new protocol or a 
new process for creating reservations or amendments for some use of 
certain substances would be a historic step, but would be no more 
radical than recognizing what is already occurring and likely to 
continue occurring under the current system and the INCB’s watch. 
 In making this recommendation, it should be emphasized that 
this suggestion is not based on ideology or animosity, but rather in 
the unmistakable evidence that international drug prohibition has not 
accomplished its goals, and that further forms of legalization appear 
all but inevitable. The INCB and other international actors have been 
unable to address the global drug problem in terms of use or 
trafficking. As an outgrowth of this failure, the INCB has also been 
unable stop member states from experimenting with alternatives to 
prohibition, including drug decriminalization and legalization.  
Continued inflexibility will not change this outcome, but would 
rather undermine the Single Convention, and international law in 
general. Accordingly, it would be in the best interest of the Single 
Convention’s supporters to create a new protocol allowing for limited 
reforms along the lines of those taking place in Bolivia, Uruguay, the 
United States, and other countries. Accepting this recommendation 
will require serious concessions, but failure to recognize the changing 
status of drug reform bears much greater risks. Many policymakers 
and members of the public have already appreciated this shift, and 
change is coming, and will continue to come, with or without the 
Single Convention. With the weight of elite criticism and public 
opinion building, the only question now is whether the Single 
Convention’s supporters think it is better for that treaty to bend, or to 
break. 
